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Case Comments
Decisions of International and Foreign Tribunals
International Court of Justice
AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND v. FRANCE (Nuclear Tests)1
On 22 June 1973, the International Court of Justice, by 8 votes to 6,
rendered orders indicating, pending its final decision in the cases concerning Nuclear Tests, the following provisional measures of protection:
The Governments of Australia, New Zealand and France should each
ensure that no action of any kind is taken which might aggravate or extend
the dispute submitted to the Court or prejudice the rights of the other party
in respect of the carrying out of whatever decision the Court may render in
the case; and, in particular, the French Government should avoid nuclear
tests causing the deposit of radioactive fall-out on Australian territory, the
territory of New Zealand, the Cook Islands, Niue or the Tokelau Islands.
In indicating interim measures, the Court took into account the following
considerations, inter alia:
(1) the material submitted to the Court leads it to the conclusion, at the
present stage of the proceedings, that the provisions invoked by the Applicants with regard to the Court's jurisdiction appear, prima facie, to afford a
basis on which that jurisdiction might be founded;
(2) it cannot be assumed a priori that the claims of the Australian and
New Zealand Governments fall completely outside the purview of the
Court's jurisdiction or that the Governments may not be able to establish a
legal interest in respect of these claims entitling the Court to admit the
Applications; and
(3) for the purpose of the present proceedings, it suffices to observe that
the information submitted to the Court does not exclude the possibility that
*B.A. (1940) and LL.B. (1942), Tulane University; member, American Inter-American,
Louisiana State, New Orleans (member, Executive Committee), and Federal Bar Association,
American Judicature Society and Maritime Law Association; president (1972), New
Orleans Chapter, Federal Bar Association; president 1957-59), Phi Delta Phi International
Legal Fraternity.
'See also 7 INT'L LAW. 762 (July 1973).
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damage to Australia and New Zealand might be shown to be caused by the
deposit on Australian and New Zealand territory of radioactive fall-out
resulting from such tests and to be irreparable.
The Court concluded that it was unable to accede, at the present stage of
the proceedings, to the request made by the French Government that the
cases be removed from the list. However, the decision in no way prejudges
the question of the jurisdiction of the Court to deal with the merits of the
cases, or any question relating to the admissibility of the Applications, or
relating to the merits themselves, and leaves unaffected the right of the
French Government to submit arguments in respect to those questions.
The Court further decided that the written pleadings shall first be addressed to the question of the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the
dispute, and of the admissibility of the Applications, and fixed 21 September 1973 as the time-limit for the Memorials of the Governments of
Australia and New Zealand and 21 December 1973 as the time-limit for
the Counter-Memorial of the French Government.
By order entered 12 July 1973 in each of these two cases concerning
Nuclear Tests, the Court, by 8 votes to 5, decided to defer its consideration of two applications by the Government of Fiji for permission to
intervene in the proceedings until it had pronounced upon the questions to
which the pleadings mentioned in its orders of 22 June 1973 are to be
addressed.
In the meantime, it has been reported by several reliable sources that on
21 July 1973, the French Government proceeded with a nuclear explosion
over the atoll of Muroroa in the South Pacific. See, e.g., Wall Street
Journal,Vol. LI1, No. 15 (July 23, 1973), p. 1; The New York Times, Vol.
CXXII, No. 42,183 (July 22, 1973), p. 6.
PAKISTAN v. INDIA (Trial of Pakistani Prisoners of War) 2
On 4, 5 and 26 June 1973 the Court held public hearings on the request
by Pakistan for interim measures of protection, relating to a dispute concerning accusations of genocide made against 195 Pakistani prisoners of
war and civilian internees detained in India, at which hearings the representatives of the Government of Pakistan were present and submitted
observations. The Government of Pakistan had chosen as judge ad hoc Sir
Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, who sat in the proceedings until 2 July 1973.
By letter dated 11 July 1973, the Agent for Pakistan informed the Court
that it was expected that negotiations would very shortly be taking place
between Pakistan and India in which the issues which were the subject of
2

See 7

INT'L LAW.

727 (July 1973).
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Pakistan's Application would be under discussion, and asked the Court to
postpone further consideration of its request for interim measures in order
to facilitate those negotiations, and to fix time-limits for the filing of written
pleadings.
By order dated 13 July 1973 the Court, by 8 votes to 4, decided that the
written proceedings in the above case shall first be addressed to the
question of its jurisdiction to entertain the dispute, and fixed 1 October
1973 as the time-limit for the filing of a Memorial by the Government of
Pakistan and 15 December 1973 as that for the filing of a Counter-Memorial by the Government of India.
In the recitals of its order of 13 July 1973, the Court stated that the fact
that Pakistan now asks it to postpone further consideration of its request
for the indication of interim measures signifies that the Court no longer has
before it a request for interim measures which is to be treated as a matter
of urgency. The Court therefore concluded that it is not called upon to
pronounce upon the request, but in the circumstances, must first of all
satisfy itself that is has jurisdiction to entertain the dispute.
UNITED KINGDOM AND GERMANY v. ICELAND
(Fisheries Jurisdiction)

By order entered on 12 July 1973 in each of the two Fisheries Jurisdiction cases, the Court, by 11 votes to 3, has confirmed that the provisional
measures indicated in operative paragraph 1 of the Orders of 17 August
1972 should, subject to the power of revocation or modification conferred
on the Court by paragraph 7 of Article 61 of its 1946 Rules, remain
operative until the Court has given final judgment in each case. 3
In its considerations mentioned in each order, the Court observed that:
(1) negotiations have taken place or are taking place between the States
concerned with a view to reaching an interim arrangement pending final
settlement of the disputes;
(2) the provisional measures indicated by the Court do not exclude an
interim arrangement which may be agreed upon by the Governments
concerned, based on catch-limitation figures different from those indicated
as maxima by the Court and on related restrictions concerning areas closed
to fishing, number and type of vessels allowed and forms of control of the
agreed provisions; and
(3) The Court, pending the final decision, and in the absence of such
interim arrangement, must remain concerned to preserve, by the indication
3
See 6 INT'L LAW. 665 (July, 1972) and 889 (Oct., 1972); 7 INT'L LAW. 232 (Jan., 1973)
and 505 (April, 1973).
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of provisional measures, the rights which may subsequently be adjudged by
the Court to belong respectively to the parties.
Applicationfor Review of Judgment No. 158,
United NationsAdministrative Tribunal
A request for an advisory opinion had been submitted to the Court on 3
July 1972 by a letter of 28 June 1972 from the Secretary-General of the
United Nations in the following terms:
The Committee on Applications for Review of Administrative Tribunal
Judgments has decided that there is a substantial basis within the meaning of
Article 11 of the Statute of the Administrative Tribunal for the application for
the review of Administrative Tribunal Judgment No. 158, delivered at Geneva on 28 April 1972.
Accordingly, the Committee requests an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the following questions:
1. Has the Tribunal failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it as contended
in the applicant's application to the Committee on Applications for Review of
Administrative Tribunal Judgments (A/AC.86/R. 59)?
2. Has the Tribunal committed a fundamental error in procedure which
has occasioned a failure of justice as contended in the applicant's application
to the Committee on Applications for Review of Administrative Tribunal
Judgments (A/AC.86/R.59)?
The International Court of Justice decided, by 10 votes to 3, to comply
with the request, and on 12 July 1973, rendered its Advisory Opinion:
(a) with regard to Question I, by 9 votes to 4, that the Administrative
Tribunal has not failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it as contended
in the application to the Committee on Applications for Review of Administrative Tribunal Judgments; and
(b) with regard to Question 11, by 10 votes to 3, that the Administrative
Tribunal has not committed a fundamental error in procedure which has
occasioned a failure of justice as contended in the application to the
Committee on Applications for Review of Administrative Tribunal Judgments.
An extended analysis of the Advisory Opinion may be found in ICJ
Communiqui No. 73/26 (12 July 1973).
INDIA
G. Y. BHANDARE v. ERASMO (All India Reporter 1972 Goa 28)
This proceeding arose from an election petition involving the question of
citizenship under clause 2 of the Goa, Daman and Diu (Citizenship) Order,
1962. Respondent contended that since he was born in Goa on December
22, 1938, he became a citizen of India from December 20, 1961 under
clause 2 of the Goa, Daman and Diu (Citizenship) Order, 1962; that the
International Lawyer, Vol. 7, No. 4
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national status of a subject of annexed territory was a matter for the State
to decide, so that the courts of law could not interfere in the matter; and
that accordingly, the question of his loss of citizenship should be referred
to the Government of India for its decision under Section 9(2) of the
Citizenship Act, 1955 and the rules made thereunder. Petitioner asserted
that respondent never acquired Indian citizenship and that the question of
his losing it did not arise; and since this case did not involve the loss of
citizenship, it could not be referred to the Central Government for decision, and the court had jurisdiction to decide the question.
In dismissing the election petition, the Court concluded, inter alia:
"The question whether a person has acquired Indian citizenship or not
by virtue of the Citizenship Order cannot be determined by a reference to
the provisions of the main part of C 1. 2 alone of that order, clause 2 being
inseparable from its provisos. The first proviso has to be considered along
with clause 2 as the acquisition of Indian citizenship under clause 2
depends upon any declaration made under the first proviso to that clause.
It follows that the determination of the validity of a declaration made
under the proviso forms an integral part of the process as ascertaining
whether a person has or has not acquired Indian citizenship under clause 2
of the Citizenship Order. If while determining the question of the validity
of the declaration I come to the conclusion that a valid declaration was
made under the first proviso of clause 2, the words 'shall not be deemed to
have become a citizen of India as aforesaid' occurring in the first proviso
shall have to be given its full effect, which is to totally neutralize the effect
of the words 'shall be deemed to have become a citizen of India' occurring
in clause 2. In that event the respondent is deemed to have never acquired
Indian citizenship and therefore no reference to the Central Government
for determination of any question under Section 9(2) read with rule 30 need
be made. If on the other hand I come to the conclusion that the alleged
declaration dated 27-4- 1962 is not valid or if the petitioner fails to prove
that the respondent never was an Indian citizen a reference to the Government of India to determine the question whether the respondent had lost
the Indian citizenship which he acquired, must necessarily follow."
RANG RAO v. STATE OF MYSORE (All India Reporter 1972 Mysore 98)
A petition for writ raised the question of constitutional validity of the
provisions of the Mysore (Abolition of Cash Grants) Act, 1967, which
abolished, with retroactive effect, the payment of cash grants, which the
petitioners had used to obtain from the former State of Hyderabad, now
merged into the State of Mysore after the coming into force of the Indian
Constitution.
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The object of that part of the Act under attack is to discontinue certain
classes of cash grants in the Hyderabad Area of the new State of Mysore.
Section 4 of the Act in effect seeks to discontinue payment of cash grants
not merely in future, but also retroactively as of a date long prior to the
passage of the Act. Under that section, a sum equal to four times the
annual amount payable to the grantee, is provided as compensation both
for past arrears of cash grants and for recurring payments which have been
discontinued.
The petitioners, while challenging the validity of the Act, also contended
that even if the State had the power to abolish cash grants, it could do so
only prospectively and not retrospectively. It was further argued that the
obligation to pay them, and the corresponding right to receive them, had
accrued and crystallized into a liability to pay certain sums of money
towards cash grants and a corresponding right in the petitioners to receive
such sums of money from the State; and that the State could not acquire a
person's right to receive a sum of money by paying, by way of compensation, a smaller amount, nor was there any public purpose for such
acquisition.
In holding Section 4 unconstitutional, the Court noted that the result
would have been different "if the Dominion of India had repudiated or
refused to recognize cash grants granted or continued by the Nizam, (and)
the petitioners would have been without any remedy." However, "once the
New State, namely, the Dominion of India, recognized such grants granted
or continued by the Nizam, subsequent repudiation of such grants, cannot
be regarded as constituting an Act of State."
COSTA RICA
NICARAGUAN HIJACKERS' CASE. 9 ICJ Review (Dec. 1972), p. 78.

On December 12, 1971, three Nicaraguan nationals hijacked a Nicaraguan passenger plane and forced the crew to fly to Costa Rica, where they
intended to refuel before continuing on to Cuba. On arrival in Costa Rica,
they threatened to attack the passengers if their demands were not satisfied
and the plane refueled, but these were refused. When a fire broke out in the
plane, the hijackers were forced to surrender. Permission to enter and
remain in Costa Rica was denied them, and they were returned by an order
of the Costa Rican Government to Nicaragua. This action to establish the
right of asylum of the hijackers was brought against the President of the
Republic and the Minister of Public Safety in Costa Rica.
The Supreme Court of Costa Rica held that extradition should be carried out in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article 31 of
the Constitution, The Hague Agreement for the Suppression of Hijacking,
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 7, No. 4
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which was ratified by Costa Rica, and the Law on Extradition (No. 4795 of
16/7/71). Both under the Penal Code of Costa Rica and under The Hague
Agreement, hijacking is regarded as a purely criminal, and not as a political, offense, so that there was no violation of paragraph I of Article 3 1 of
the Constitution. However, the decision to extradite was taken by an
executive act, without any extradition proceedings having been instituted
and without any decision of the judiciary, and the extradition was therefore
a breach of Article 31(2) of the Constitution and of Article 4 of the Law on
Extradition, and also of the provisions of The Hague Agreement. Extradition cannot be granted at the discretion of the Executive, but only by a
specific order of a court.
The Court accordingly concluded that the expulsion of the hijackers was
illegal. Since the hijackers had already been handed over to the Nicaraguan
authorities, however, the legal effect of the decision stands as a precedent
only.
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